DEUS MEUM JUS ET FORTITUDINIS

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CABINDA

THE INDEPENDENCE OF CABINDA

I have been asked to urgently express my opinion, politically and more specifically internationally speaking, on the current claim for the independence of Cabinda by the FLEC (Liberation Front for the State of Cabinda) both with regards to Portugal and Angola, to which Cabinda has been administratively linked since 1956. The reason for which seems simply a matter of governing convenience.

Regardless of this, in geographical terms Cabinda is separate from Angola. It is also ethnically and to a large degree linguistically different French is more widely spoken than Portuguese.

You will find below the conclusions of the study I have recently published on the main points of the issue of independence.

First part: Facts on the situation

1. CABINDA – ITS NATURE AND LOCATION

Cabinda is a territory currently covering an area of 10,000km².

It is therefore a small country, on the scale of Africa, bigger however than the Island of São Tomé, Principe and Fernando Po, 20 times larger than the Seychelles (404km²) and 5 times more expansive than the Island of Mauritius (1,856km²) and Archipelago of the Comoros. The Gambia is a similar size at 10,369km².

a) Resources

What are Cabinda’s resources?

If it were separated from Angola, would Angola be deprived of any of its essential needs?

Angola’s known natural resources are found across its vast territory; creating its future wealth they are extremely important. Cabinda’s own resources include the farming of cocoa, coffee, dates, bananas and food crops. Fishing, cattle and underground reserves of oil (already partially exploited), diamonds as in Angola and Magnesium Phosphate are also present. They are not at all essential to Angola’s needs and their absence would in not destabilize the economy. They would however allow Cabinda to exist as a viable international entity.

b) Population

What is it? Its difference from that of Angola.

The population of Cabinda, which stands at around 2,000,000 indigenous people, is comparable in numbers to that of the Seychelles (60,000), of Luxemburg (300,000), of the Gambia and of Equatorial Guinea. Although out of this number only one third live in the actual territory of Cabinda. The other two thirds inhabit the surroundings in a generally stable state on Congolese and Zairian territory, Cabinda’s 2 neighbours.
Cabinda’s population is ethnically distinct from that of Angola as was emphasized by His Excellency David Charles Gano, Foreign Affairs Minister for the People’s Republic of Congo and His Excellency Bagbeni, Ambassador for Zaire in Ethiopia at the 24th Session of the Council of Ministers of the O.A.U. in Addis Abba on 19th February 1975.

Cabinda’s population is closely related to that of the Congo and Zaire between which Cabinda is located (see also Jeune Afrique no. 7th May 1975, page 21). The Cabindans at least for the literate among them, are 90% French speaking and only 10% speak Portuguese. This is explained, despite the teaching in Portuguese to which the population is subject, by the geographical situation – a small enclave sandwiched between 2 francophone states. The border with these French speaking states and the ethnic links of their populations appears to be the origin of the striking difference between the population of Cabinda and lusophone Angola.

There are therefore many significant differences between the two populations that do not make life together easy (if Cabinda is to be considered as an integral part of Angola). A desire for mutual co-operation is nevertheless clearly demonstrated in Cabinda.


c) The non-contiguous nature of Angola with Cabinda and the inevitable consequences of this.

A strip of Zairian territory 60 km in width divides Angola from Cabinda. Needless to say this creates certain communication difficulties between these two territories

These difficulties, as I see it, must logically be increased by the fact that this strip of land has a strategic importance for the Republic of Zaire. It constitutes Zaire’s only access to the sea and moreover the mouth of the river “Zaire” or “Congo” is probably the country’s most important trade root.

It seems to me at first sight unlikely that Zaire could allow a continuous right of way, even for peaceful purposes, between Cabinda and Angola if both were to form a sole, single state.

The situation of Zaire reminds us of Poland from 1919 to 1939 and of its port at Gdynia. This would effectively create a new “Dantzig Corridor”. This terrible precedent serves to emphasize the danger of such situations. We remember the continued friction that occurred between Germany and Poland, which eventually led to the Second World War.

Given these facts, I am led to doubt that either Cabinda (which due to its very nature could never pose a threat to its neighbours) or larger Angola would really be best served by their joining. I would also be surprised if the neighbouring states wanted the lasting adjoining of Cabinda to Angola. Since at first consideration at least, such a situation could rapidly become dangerous and possibly develop into armed conflict, which I am sure nobody wants.

2. THE CLAIM FOR INDEPENDENCE OF CABINDA IN RELATION TO PORTUGAL AND ANGOLA AND ITS LENGTH. TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE FEELINGS OF THE POPULATION KNOWN?

Claims for independence from both Portugal and Angola have been voiced in Cabinda since the period following the administrative joining of Cabinda to Angola, announced by the Portuguese in 1956. In fact, since 1960 we have witnessed the creation of the Freedom Movement for the State of Cabinda (MLEC) followed in 1963 by the forming of two other groups (National Action Committee of the Cabindan People – CAUNC and the Mayombé Alliance – ALLIAMA) supporting the same cause. These movements quickly felt the need to unify and despite the inevitable difficulties such a joining creates, this took place between the 2nd and 4th August 1963. All individual sacrifices seem to have been made in order to create one sole movement, truly representative of the State of Cabinda (the FLEC). The leader of which Mr Luis Ranque Franque seems to be at the forefront of Cabindan Patriotism. Unlike Angolan freedom movements, the three of which have only been able to agree on a very small number of points, the FLEC had published a detailed action plan with regards to politics, the economy, society, culture and notably national defence. Furthermore at the time of forming, Mr Ranque Franque had already been received by the 4th Commission of the General Assembly of the U.N. on the 20th November 1962, (doc. of the 17th session of the General Assembly, 4th commission – 4/SR1391 23XI1962).

I was not surprised when reading a text I got hold of regarding an agreement made between the representatives of the so-called Angolan “Freedom Movements” (the FNLA, MPLA and UNITA) and Portugal on the 15th January 1975, article 3 of which states “Cabinda is an integral and inseparable part of Angola” (see the text of this agreement). It seems, on studying the text that this clause was included at the request of the Angolan parties. This immediately asks us to decide whether these three Angolan parties can really be considered representative of the Cabindan people’s opinion?

Reading the above-mentioned agreement further leads me to express doubt on article four where a very singular position is adopted concerning the meeting and election of the Constituent Assembly. Candidates for which will only be selected from the three Angolan movements, who are declared as the only representatives of the Angolan people (implying also the Cabindan people).

According to documents I have in my possession, the Angolan Movements would have little or no following at all in Cabinda whose population and intellectuals have long, almost entirely backed Cabinda’s own freedom party. As we have seen, it has been the FLEC who have solely represented their desire for independence both towards Angola as well as Portugal since 1963.

It surprised me a little to see however that the incorporation of Cabinda to Angola was announced in article three of the agreement. This is due to the fact that the Portuguese constitution itself had distinguished Cabinda as separate from Angola, (see articles 1& 2 of the Portuguese constitution 1933 – reference is made again to this afterwards). There is no denying of these facts, surprising as they are, however we must also examine and take into account the legal aspects of this.

Moreover the FLEC on numerous occasions has it would seem requested a referendum take place under the authority and assurance of the UN and OAU so as to establish whether the Cabindan people truly wanted independence from again both Angola and Portugal.

All of this naturally leads me to wonder if articles 3 and 41 of the convention dating from 15 January 1975 are actually appropriate to the reality of the situation, particularly with regard to the trend of Cabindan opinion - given also that the authorities want to prohibit the Cabindan movements from freely expressing themselves.

3. IMPRESSIONS GAINED FROM THE ANALYSIS OF THE ABOVE FACTS

After considering all of these facts, we are led to question whether it would really be wise for Angola to annex a small territory, quite capable of being self sufficient. What’s more this territory can be described as ethnically and linguistically distinct as well as geographically separate. Annexing Cabinda could spark major difficulties in the region however above all this is wholly against the wish of Cabinda’s population.

The reality of the situation in Cabinda has not been taken into account in the Luso-Angolan agreement of 1975 and I must express my serious doubts over this. These doubts have recently grown after I read, within the last few days, the intervention made by representatives of the Congo and Zaire on 19th February 1975 at the OAU. They were further repeated with greater vigour on 9th April 1975 in Dar-es-Salam by His Excellency Bula Mandungu Myati, Zairian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. (See text of these interventions of which I have underlined certain passages. These should be taken into account when examining all the facts of the issue.)

Second Part: The Situation of Cabinda through its historical and legal aspects

Several issues should be raised:

1. IN WHAT LEGAL CIRCUMSTANCES DID THE ACQUISITION OF ANGOLA AND CABINDA TO PORTUGAL TAKE PLACE?

Firstly we will have to go back to the rather distant origins of this. It was in fact Portuguese explorations dating from the 14th Century that discovered what went on to be called the kingdoms of N’Goyo and Kakongo, spread over a vast, imprecise territory perhaps where the current Ivory Coast is, around Luanda far south of the mouth of the Congo.

a) The gaining of Cabinda took place relatively recently and is well known. It originated from three Protectorate treaties passed at the end of the 19th Century.

They are:

· The CHINFUMA Treaty of 29th September 1883
· The CHICAMBA Treaty of 20th December 1884 and above all,
· The SIMULAMBUCO Treaty of 1st February 1885, which in a certain way ratified and replaced the previous two.

Let us first consider this treaty in its international and global context. When the agreement was reached, the European countries, in full colonial expansion had for a certain number of years been looking to ascertain and develop at the lowest cost, numerous, extensive areas of land on the African coastline. From here they could venture inwards towards the very centre of the continent.

However conflict broke out between the colonising states: for example a country that arrived at a particular place, left soldiers or merchant traders there or made agreements with the native leaders was often criticised by other states for settling where they themselves had a so-say stronger claim. Therefore the need was felt to establish certain rules aimed at reducing the number of these disputes as well as finding a means to resolve them and respect the right of each other’s claims.

The arrival of Savorgan de Brazza in Africa and then Stanley paved the way for a period of fierce rivalry between the two from 1879 through to 1882. Brazza was opening a highway north from the sea to the Congo whereas Stanley was heading south to the very mouth of the river (very near to Cabinda).

In Europe the Berlin Conference of 1885 met to try to diffuse the tense atmosphere that had built up among colonising powers notably as a result of the competition between Stanley and Brazza. It went on to look into the situation in a large part of the vast stretches of Africa from the south to the Sahara and to define a certain “Congo Basin” where certain rules were to be imposed. Some of the powers represented in Berlin, which had not yet fully embarked on colonialist expansion but who nevertheless had such aspirations, were inclined to ask for the settling of the leading powers in any given place to be clear and visible. Moreover they asked for it to have at least some sort of administrative authority and the other powers to be informed: such was the case of Germany.

However other European nations especially Britain, in the process of gaining lands wanted far less stringent guidelines: occupation, ownership (original process of gaining land if it was classed “res nullius”), which had been established a long time. The acquisition through conquest or the cessation there of previous power was also permitted (see Fauchille, Treaty of International Law, 1st volume, 2nd part Peace, 1925 no. 532 and following page 664 and onwards).

Nevertheless if no authority grants or recognises a certain territory or if this authority is not universally acknowledged, proof of discovery and settling there would have to be shown. Now, even if the land was uninhabited difficulties may still arise. For an inhabited region, as the case often was, the additional issue was that of the legitimacy of the nation’s presence. Every sort of legal theory was defended in Berlin over these points.

It was decided (according to the majority of the conference members) that there had to be a proper occupation of an annexed territory and that other Powers must be informed. However an exception based on a longstanding practice would still be allowed following efforts made by England. In basic terms when a “Protectorate” was involved, a lesser presence would be acceptable.

The final drafting of articles 34 and 35 of the Berlin Act of 1885 recognised the above. It was admitted that providing the other Powers were informed, a de facto takeover and the lack of a full presence and authority of the nation would be permitted in exchange for the sending of money or a consul. “This economically-minded behaviour was sufficient to safeguard the rights of the ‘Protector’ state,” commented Fauchille on reading the conclusions of the Berlin Conference in his great Treaty of International Public Law (1925, part no.558 page 777).

The very undemanding text of the Berlin act helped all the colonial powers (already settled or in the process of doing so) along the African Coast to continue their recent actions. A lesser occupation could be in place as long as the possession was under the title “Protectorate”. The doctrine clearly considers that a proper occupation by a so-called “Protector” state need not be essential. That said, it states that this only applies if the protected state conforms fully to the conditions of (the very stringently organised) International Law. (See Fauchille Ibidem 1952 no 558, page 780 and the numerous authors quoted.)

This nevertheless was the “convenient” solution covered by the Berlin Act. The colonial powers used the clauses of articles 34 and 35 of the Berlin Act to establish “Protectorate Treaties” which allowed them to lay claim to a territory from then on (often with the view of future annexation) without having to take on the expense of a proper administration for the country. (Also see Despagnet, writing on Protectorates page 219 onwards and several authors such as Hall, “Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of the British Crown” page 214; Westlake, Studies on the principles of International Law, page 194 as well as Jeze and Lawrence, quoted by Fauchille Ibidem page 778 and African Boundary Problems 1969 pages 6 to 16 A. Allot “Boundaries and the Law in Africa”).

It was clearly within the framework of the ongoing customs of the time, firmly set out on 26th February 1885 in the Berlin Act, that the Portuguese protectorate treaty to Cabinda was made, above all in the Simulambuco Treaty of the 1st February 1885 (note on this practice all the details of Fauchille, Treaty of International Public law 1925, 2nd part, Peace, book 1, chapter 2 no. 555, p. 776 to 780).

b) The gaining of Angola was the result of very different legal circumstance taking place between the 15th and 17th Century.

The origins of the colony in Angola go back a long time. The Portuguese arrived there in the 15th Century between 1482 and 1486 (see on this subject the Universalis Encyclopedia page 1075, vol. 1, 1968). It was in the course of these years that Navigator Diego Cão explored the coast off Angola and took possession of land and according to the customs at that time, built stone columns garlanded with the Arms of Portugal, thereby setting up a Portuguese colony there.

In the 16th and 17th Century the Portuguese extended their influence further inland, continuing to establish small defences at stages. However, a stubborn resistance was encountered (this as we shall see was not the case in Cabinda as leaders agreed the treaty of 1885, accepted immediately by the population there). The Portuguese in Angola though had great difficulty in putting an end to the persistent resistance there. During the 17th and 18th centuries this was down to the Bantous and the Tribu N’gola, which later went on to give Angola its name. In this period we even witnessed the Dutch, rival colonialists, take control of Angola (between 1640 & 1648). The Portuguese nevertheless re-established rule there from 1648 onwards, despite almost continuous fighting with the natives. The current boundaries of Angola had been long established when they were finally fixed and recognised during the Berlin Conference.

Therefore the historical context in which the Portuguese settled in Angola is very different from that of Cabinda. Further analysis emphasises this statement and it will be shown that the legal concepts and circumstances involved in the taking over of the two territories were even more distinct.

Until the 16th Century the gaining of new lands rarely rested on the principle of the “sole discoverer” or the “sole conqueror” (which were however claimed as being very significant) but particularly in the case of Portugal on the consent or agreement of the Pope. The Vatican in fact since the Middle Ages had every means and claim to be able to ‘grant’ empires both on inhabited and uninhabited land. We should remember that a Pope deposed (i.e. excommunicated) John Lack land, King of England and that another (Gregory VII) forced Emperor Henry IV to apologise to Canossa. Furthermore several Pontiffs actually took part in the very organisation of certain nations. (See FAUCHILLE treaty op. quo. T.1. 2nd Peace 1925 no.538 p.685 onwards; see also Sibert, quoted by Fauchille). We can even find ancient precedents in papal correspondence with Pépin Le Bref and in the Coronation of Charlemagne in 800). The Pope was considered for centuries as Lord of all Kingdoms on earth. It is worth mentioning with regards to this the “Bulle” (decree) Unam Sanctam de Boniface VIII” on the 18th November 1302 and other such later acts.

The discovery and invasion coupled with a carte blanche from the Pope formed Portugal’s ‘right’ to Angola. The Portuguese in fact benefited from many such go-aheads from the Popes Martin V, Eugene (between 1417 and 1447) and notably Nicholas V, which coincided with the Portuguese arrival on the Guinea Coast. Very vague limitations were set there on Portugal’s right to colonise. Moreover this is all strengthened by Sixte IV, not to mention Pope Alexander VI’s famous decree, which effectively shared the world between Spain and Portugal to colonise.

Al though in fact it should be noted that Christian Sovereigns did not acknowledge the “favouring” of Portugal by the Vatican in the long run. From the 16th Century we saw Francois I of France ask the Pope to show him the clause from Adam’s testament, which deprived him of the right to colonise.

The fact remains that Portugal’s entitlement to Angola was at the time mainly down to it being the first power to discover, raise its standard and construct it’s armorial columns as well as the papal decree. It goes without saying that countries benefiting from this would use the broadest interpretation possible. Other explorers of less “favoured” nations would have to settle for the simpler signs of conquest (as listed above). That is what Jacques Cartier went on to do a little later in Canada.


c) A complete difference must therefore be noted in the legal circumstances, methods used and time period of the gaining of Angola and Cabinda to Portugal.

The legal circumstances of the Portuguese settling in Angola have no similarities to an agreement made by the people or their representatives. Whereas their take over of Cabinda at the end of the 19th Century through the above mentioned treaties (notably the Simulambuco Treaty) showed a step forward for international “opino juris”, i.e. an idea (albeit very vague) of a “certain right of people to choose for themselves”, since it was formed by representatives of the Cabindan people. In fact there is also acceptance of a basic form of this idea (coupled with a dominant concern to protect the interests of the European colonialists) in the clauses of the Berlin Act.

It resulted form this text that local leaders approved of the protectorate treaty, considering that a proper occupation was not necessary and the local leaders felt safety through the assurances of a foreign power. This was therefore what the Simulambuco Treaty achieved.

2. ANALYSIS OF THE PROTECTORATE TREATIES MADE BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF CABINDA.

A detailed look into the measures of the CHINFUMA (1883) and CHICAMBA (1884) Treaties is fruitless since they were rectified and superseded by the Simulambuco Treaty.

a) What were the commitments made by Portugal in the signing of the Simulambuco Treaty?

This treaty was preceded by a request, which focuses on the European doctrine on the matter; this is a thinly veiled reference to the Berlin Conference, which took place at that period but had yet to publish its final act. In this request the Princes, Governors and other important Cabindans (relatively large in their number for such a small territory) made clear their wish for the territory to be placed under the protection of Portugal. This request dates from the 22nd January 1885.

As mentioned, there were numerous Governors and Princes who requested the protectorate be made but even more of them who actually signed the treaty. The majority of which simply signed with a cross. In fact only two actually signed their names. Everything took place in the presence of Portuguese and Cabindan witnesses.
In response to the voices expressed (most likely very voluntarily) the Captain of the corvette Queen of Portugal concluded the treaty with the leaders on the 1st February 1885, made up on their part by 20 crosses and two signatures.

Did all the leaders, despite the detailed explanations given to them, clearly understand the agreement they were entering into and did they fully comprehend the all the legal terms included? It seems to me that this could be legitimately doubted considering they were almost all illiterate. If the notions of “sovereignty”, “subject of the Portuguese Crown”, “protectorate”, “useful ownership” (direct law) and “eminent ownership” were unknown and meaningless to them (although a few definitions may have been offered) it could scarcely be doubted that these leaders were given to believe that Portugal guaranteed to maintaining their authority and the territorial integrity of their country.

It was simple, easy to take hold of and didn’t signify and legal responsibility nor require any extensive investigation. Whatever legal controversy that could arise over the character of the protectorate in terms of international or internal law of the regime created by the Simulambuco Treaty, it seems certain in any case that the leaders had believed the two conditions above were guaranteed.

b) The theory on the protectorates and the diverse forms that they take.

The interpretation of the Cabindan Protectorate.

Two theories could be upheld over the Simulambuco Treaty. Some would say that it was a protectorate of international law passed between a Protector State and a Protected State (Cabinda) and therefore it fitted into the framework of a typical “international protectorate”. The situation was thus comparable to the former French Protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco for example. For this thesis, were are led to seriously doubt the validity, in an international context of the Portuguese Act of 1956, which joined Angola and Cabinda under a largely communal administration.

This legal theory does however highlight the extremely loose nature of the protectorate system and its ability to include politically very diverse circumstances, themselves subject to change (See Lampué, particulars of colonial legislation 1970, page 78 n° 99 and Roland and Lampué, Details of Law of the Overseas Territories. Dalloz 1952 n° 79 pages 89 & 90. “The regimes of Protectorates are very diverse and naturally unstable”, declared Mr De La Pradelle, vice official of France at the Court of International Justice, 10,11&12th January 1923 (see Court of International Justice, series C, n° 2), Documents related to the Consultative Advice n° 4, pages 151 to 154, “The Protectorate could both result in independence and annexation”. (See Fauchille, Treaty of 1925, n° 558, page 779).).

It would however seem to me debatable whether the Simulambuco Treaty was made between two states in international law, Cabinda was at that period scarcely recognised internationally and may well have not had in 1885 everything necessary for political, administrative and legal working according to the minimum international standard of that time (see Despagnet n° 10, page 238 and n° 1 page 254. See also Fauchille, Treaty of International Public Law 1925, vol.1, 2nd Part, Peace, book 1, chapter 2, pages 726 to 781. Also Sibert: Treaty of International Public Law, page 157 and Lampué, Particulars of Colonial Legislation 1940 page 77 and onwards, furthermore page 68 and onwards of Details of Law of the Overseas Territories by Lampué and Roland. Dalloz 1952 n° 79 pages 79 & 89 and onwards, Adde “Letter from Mr Poincaré to Mr De Fleuriau, responsible for affairs in London on 23rd August 1912” in French diplomatic documents, 3rd series, vol. 3, n° 319).

We therefore conclude that because there was no ‘proper’ protectorate state, the agreements made with the local leaders could not be fully considered as international treaties. Furthermore, keeping the status of the local leaders was probably only a form of indirect government and Cabinda was thus only a “colonial protectorate” seeing as later it was adjoined to another colony and jointly administered. The inhabitants could even have received the title “Portuguese nationals”, (the words “Portuguese nationals” like for French were found in many treaties interpreted very broadly and also covered a Protectorate” See on this subject a debate on the interpretation of Franco-Japanese treaty of the 4th August 1896 in the “Diplomatic Archives” of the French Parliament, 2nd series, volume 64, pages 218-219 as well as the French Decree of 25th November 1913 in the 1914 Clunet and the President’s report, preceding it which gives the sense of the word “national” which applied to both the “protected population and the actual nationals”.) or even Portuguese citizenship (see Lampué p. 68, n° 111 and the majority of writers on International Law, the list of which is too long to detail). Historically such protectorates have been widely resorted to in the Congo Basin, as pointed out earlier (see on this specific point: Particulars of Law of the Overseas States, 1952, page 90).

Therefore at least from a Portuguese point of view, a purposeful annexation of Cabinda and her population progressively took place. This idea cannot be ignored and is supported by the conditions of the Simulambuco Treaty addressing Portuguese sovereignty (the Annual Celebration of the Treaty’s anniversary have been held in Cabinda and Lisbon with some degree of importance, however with opposing senses.

Seemingly relevant for all this would be the fact that in article 1 of the treaty the local leaders (for themselves and their successors) agree voluntarily to respect Portuguese sovereignty. In article 2, Portugal recognises and upholds the authority of these leaders and in article 9 Portugal states that it will respect and assure the respect of the country’s traditions and customs. They could be taken in the same (or again opposing) meaning. It remains in article 3 that Portugal is obliged to uphold the integrity of territories placed under their protection, already mentioned and which we will see later.

In brief, it can be affirmed that none of the Portuguese who signed the treaty in 1885 constituted a recognised figure of International Law and that Cabinda itself could not be considered as a ‘proper’ state. Consequently, it was not one such protectorate treaty made in a broad time period, between two internationally recognised states and taking advantage of a developed from of government. One of these such treaties would have been that made between France and Tunisia (for example in his speech to the UN Security Council proposing Tunisia’s admission to the UN, Mr De Guiringaud representing France insisted on the fact that Tunisia had long been recognised as a state of International Law (732nd sitting of the 26th July 1956) or Morocco could be another example (See Fauchille, Treaty of International Public Law, volume 1,1926, 2nd part, Peace no.176, page 264 and 1925 no. 558, page 776 and Lampué, Colonial Legislation, Dalloz, 1940, pages 5 and onwards. Also Strupp, volume 1, page 62 of Adde Flore, the Colonial Protectorate and the are of influence in The General Review of International Public Law, 1907, page 148 as well as Lampué, Particulars of Law of the Overseas States, no. 79, page 90 and Sibert, Treaty of International Public Law.) We could therefore conclude from this that a “Colonial Protectorate” was involved, which didn’t impart to the leaders or the territories they represented true sovereignty and they had little of no understanding of this. However the treaty did undoubtedly grant authority to the leaders and they were left, subject to conditions, a large degree of administrative freedom. A commitment was also made to respect the integrity of the territory. This final point would seem to effectively rule out in all respects any future ‘passing’ of Cabinda to another state, or an all or part joining of it to any other territory (except perhaps in a federal way).

A legally very important point of this interpretation, by Portugal itself regarding its commitments, can be found in the text of the very Constitution of 1933. In the part entitled “Fundamental Guarantees”, it quotes Cabinda in a totally different context to Angola and thus distinguishes Cabinda fully form other parts of Portuguese territory, notably even Angola (it is highly significant that despite the 1956 act linking the Cabinda to Angola, the 1971 edition of the Portuguese Constitution in its 1st Title “Da Nação Portuguesa”, articles 1 & 2 still differentiates between Angola and Cabinda (page 7)).

Similarly the anniversary of Simulambuco Treaty continues to be celebrated each year in Cabinda (and only in Cabinda), which serves to show that the distinction between Angola and Cabinda is effectively maintained.

c) What was the nature of the joining (in 1956) of Cabinda to Angola?

All the above facts lead us to believe that attaching Cabinda, decided relatively recently by Portugal in 1956 could not have been a legal joining and was contrary to the Portuguese Constitution itself, merely a measure to facilitate administrative organisation, in no way making Cabinda lose its legal characteristics.

Numerous examples of this “grouping together” actually took place elsewhere in the world. For example, in former French Indochina several Protectorates were joined under a sole Governor General or High Commissioner (for example Ann am and Cambodia) (Enumerated as such by Fauchille: Treaty 1956 no. 275 & 276 consisting of the “Colonial Territories” (of Hanoi, Haiphong and Tourane) an actual “colony”, which at that very time roughly grouped together as overseas territories with links to the Protector (France): (Cochin-china) different fractions of territories legally difficult to define (e.g. Laos) and singled leased territory. Kiang Cho Wan.

In truth, some of the “Protectorates” of Indochina were relatively comparable to that of Cabinda (especially those which now make up the state of Laos – see the situation of the territories making up the “Kingdom of Laos” in The Particulars of Law of the Overseas States, Rolland & Lampué, 1949, no. 114 pages 114 &115).
Therefore Cabinda, even when administratively tied to Angola, had been able to remain not only geographically, ethnically and linguistically different but also legally different and vice versa. Portugal, in accordance with its constitution, could not justifiably really pass Cabinda over to Angola through the agreement of 15th January 1975. Essentially, in view of its own constitution of 1933, upholding everything that was not against the constitutional new law of May 1974, by the 1st article of this new law (which is true for articles 1 &2 of the 1933 Constitution.)

Furthermore, through the 1st article of the new constitutional bill of the 14th May 1974 but also considering the Portuguese decree 203/74, complementing the above bill, it states in the 7th part, entitled “Overseas Policy”, paragraph b: “These populations should decide their own future”, in respect of the principles of self-determination. This should be equally valid for Cabinda.

Finally, let us consider the Simulambuco Treaty and the upholding of Cabinda’s integrity, which the treaty envisaged.

3. COULD THE ADMINISTRATIVE ATTACHMENT IN 1956 OF CABINDA TO ANGOLA CONSTITUTE AN OBSTACLE, WHEN INDEPENDENCE OF PORTUGAL’S TERRITORIES ARRIVED, TO CABINDA BECOMING COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT FROM ANGOLA?

A negative answer seems clear.

a) Legally, there is nothing to our knowledge, not even one text, which could prevent the independence of a new state, from the moment when the state on which it had been previously dependent ceases to have authority on that territory.

b) Internationally speaking, in practice the circumstances that Cabinda (or any other territory) had previously been linked administratively to another Portuguese territory (i.e. Angola) has never been an obstacle.

Nothing can be put forward against the future independence from either Angola or Portugal. As we have seen, the joining to Angola was seemingly made purely to make governing easier and maybe even less regulated, in view of the Portuguese Constitution in force at the time. (It has already been noted, despite the 1956 act joining the territories, that the text of this stayed the same and continued to distinguish Cabinda from Angola in the official journal O Diario de Governo, no. 198, first series of 23rd August 1971 (art. 1 & 2). Furthermore this text has remained up to now in accordance with the constitutional bill of 1974.)

Far from creating an obstacle, the attachment in fact proves similar to many previous situations of colonies, territorial colonies and protectorates administratively grouped together (sometimes more or less federally) all of which went on to become fully independent. All these examples justify independence in Cabinda.

The number of these situations is such that it would be tedious to quote all of them. Let us cite only the recent cases in Africa itself where there are new ‘brother’ states previously joined in French West Africa and Equatorial French Africa, on the very borders of Cabinda. The People’s Republic of Congo, an immediate neighbour of Cabinda, was previously part of EFA. Similarly under the administration of a sole Belgian Governor General, residing at Kinshasa were the territories of Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda who all had adjoining borders. Zaire was the first to gain independence but did not go on afterwards to claim Burundi or Rwanda.

Indochina was composed in a similar way out of colonies, protectorates, colonial protectorates and one leased territory, all joined together under the one General Government. This grouping did not stop any of its former constituent members from gaining eventual independence.

Previously, a certain relationship was highlighted between the situations of Laos and Cabinda. Laos is now independent although in fact none of the protectorates of Indochina was fully considered a protectorate under international law (see Fauchille, Treaty, vol. 1, 1st part, 1926, no. 185, p. 276 and Lampué, 1940, p.382 onwards no.485 to 489) and all of them even Ann Am were attached to the Ministère des Colonies. All were able to become and now are independent. Laos however did not even exist in law in 1940 and for most of its history before independence was merely “an unnamed territory”, removed only on the sovereignty of Ann Am. Therefore Laos firstly developed into a protectorate of internal law, then of international law in the treaty of the 29th August 1941 (see Lampué, Particulars of Law of the Overseas States, 1949, p.124 & 125, no. 114) and finally by stages became initially an associated state, then along with the other states in the region became completely independent (it is interesting to follow the stages of this evolution in the works of the great specialist on this subject Professor Lampué above all in his piece with Rolland of 1952, showing the concomitant progress of the 1st administrative and legal organisation of Indochina (notably pages 546 onwards, no. 565 onwards). See also on the subject of associated states, which preceded independence in the French Empire, the parliamentary debates of the National Assembly, 1959 pages 2868 to 2869 and those of the Assembly of French Union, 1950, page 791 as well as the association treaties between France and Vietnam (4th June 1954), France and Cambodia (8th November 1949), France and Laos (19th July 1949 & 22nd October 1963).) The territories of FWA also went to this later.

It should be noted however that the above situation were all contiguous territories geographically linked in a “group of territories” The conclusion that this union never stood in the way of eventual independence is all the more valid for geographically separate territories.

4. THE FRAGILITY OF ARTIFICIAL POLITICAL ATTACHMENTS

a) It must be considered that in the recent past even geographical contiguity of grouped territories has not ruled out a secessionist revolt of one or several of its parts.

This history particularly emphasises the fact that ethnic, cultural, linguistic, historical or religious mismatches risk making the state very fragile indeed, even when all in one piece, when it has been somewhat artificially put together. On this point, recent examples of this type of difficulty in Katanga and Biafra where nothing physically separated them from the rest of Zaire or Nigeria unfortunately turned out to be instructive. They were largely due to the sharp diversities of the population but in both cases were found within the borders of those countries when independence was achieved.

But what would the case be if more extensive differences coupled with a large geographical separation gave rise to the birth and development of distinct national feelings?

b) For non-contiguous territories, it very often seems much better not to link them rather artificially to other states.

The doctrine of new independent states to keep to the borders they inherited from colonisation and not to allow inside of any state the success of any secessionist movement constitutes the only way in which a new state could rely on roughly precise borders and benefit from the peaceful co-existence of heterogeneous populations, making use of a common language and culture left by the coloniser to consolidate and unify the country. This doctrine however seems difficult to apply in reality if too many elements of their past and history as well as too many ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences separate the population from the rest of their ‘homeland’ and moreover they are geographically apart. It is thus quite clear that an artificially created national unity is unlikely to be maintained long. Difficulties will quickly come to light recent examples of which are memorable to all who witnessed them.

When the lack of geographical contiguity adds to those considerable difficulties listed above, the solution taken with regards to the Cape Verde Islands and Guinea Bissau seems much wiser (the Lisbon Agreement of the 18th December 1974 between Portugal and the PAIGC made prevision for separate independence for the islands on the 5th July 1975, see article 10, although the two territories campaigned together for liberation as one party. Here they were wary of joining the two when there was too much of a risk of them not getting on. Today forced marriages work no better between populations than they do people.

5. WHAT IS THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE WHICH DOMINATES THE ISSUE OF CLAIMS FOR INDEPENDENCE?

We now come to the main aspect of this document; that is the issue of the rights of people to decide for themselves, originating from modern law at the time of decolonisation. This right, which is no longer contested by any writer, means that a population, having reached a certain degree of development have the right, if they so wish, to independence and freedom. From the time when the Angolan people were considered to have reached this degree of development, knowledge and civilisation and this had also been reached in Cabinda, Portugal put an end to their authority in Angola (and Cabinda). So how could an annexation or joining to Angola be imposed if Cabinda wanted to exist separately? Since before World War II it has in theory been impossible in terms of the law of colonising states to refuse the population this, such action by the coloniser would be classed inadmissible (see Lampué, 1940, no. 8, page 9).

The United Nations charter in recent law - in article 73:

a) The Members of the United Nations who have or assume the responsibility to govern territories whose population does not yet govern themselves, recognise the principle of the primacy of the interests of these territories. They agree: to develop their ability to be able to govern themselves and to “bear in mind the population’s political aspirations. To refuse to do this would be against a number of resolutions and declarations made by the General Assembly of the UN such as declaration 1514, 15th Session on the issue of independence of colonial territories of the 14th December 1960, which proclaimed that “All peoples have the free right to self determination”. In accordance with this right they may freely choose their own policies and “economical, social and cultural development” (General Assembly, 15th Session measures page 7)

In the same way we should also mention the action plan for the full application of this declaration no. 2623, 25th Session of the 12th October 1970, which on this point dismisses any distinction between large or small territories (see action plan: UN Documents, GA 25th Session p. 2).

Finally note declaration 1803, 16th Session on the “permanent sovereignty over natural resources” of the 14th December 1962 (no. 1 & 3 of this declaration, p. 15).

In any case experience shows that trying to maintain foreign authority on a country whose population truly yearns independence, proves in the long run to be in vain. The recent struggle of Portugal itself serves as an example.

For our case, a recent and very important text came into play, which obliges Portugal to consider first and foremost the wishes of the population; this is the decree no. 203/74 of the 15th May 1974, applying to the constitutional measures in transition (Law no. 3/74) of Portugal, to which article 3 of this “provisional” constitution refers. This decree includes in the 7th part, paragraph b an indication that Overseas Portuguese Territories should be able to “decide their future in respect of the principle of self determination” (see publication of the interim Government (fr) entitled Les Hommes et Les Programmes (Anuario Comercial Press of Portugal), Lisbon June 1974, pages 27 & 44).

6. WHAT CLUES ARE THERE OF A DESIRE TO MUTUALLY LIVE TOGETHER, BE THESE “ANGOLO-CABINDAN” OR “PARTICULARLY IN CABINDA”?

One last issue should be looked into, which it seems essential to resolve legally and that is the certainty of a common wish to live as one, expressed by the FLEC on behalf of the Cabindan population. Furthermore this wish is effectively decided by way of the establishing of a distinct, separate state form Angola. Naturally (as an immediate consequence) we must question the authenticity of this observation with regards to the desire for possible independence.

I have documents in my possession showing (as previously mentioned) that for a long while the Cabindan freedom movement (considered representative in the document I have) has been unified. These were at one time three movements: the Liberation Movement for the State of Cabinda (MLEC), the Action Committee for the National Union of Cabindans (CAUNC) and the Mayombé Alliance (ALLIAMA). As stated above, these groups formed, between the 2nd and 4th August 1963, formed the united movement the Liberation Movement for the State of Cabinda (FLEC), the president of which is Mr Louis Ranque Franque. Therefore it essentially seems that from 1963 the FLEC has been totally representative of all the freedom movements created in Cabinda.

This is not what we have witnessed in Angola whose 3 ‘liberation movements’ have scarcely been able to agree on a few areas and not enough to put forward a joint plan, as we previously found out.

Furthermore, the adverse reactions on one hand of the Cabindan population on the setting up on their soil of an office of one of the Angolan Movements and on the other the fusion of the 3 Cabindan parties in one sole movement (seemingly now mature and strong) are very strong indicators of the representative character of the FLEC.

Nevertheless, the only way to truly know the wish of the Cabindan population would be by means of a referendum properly organised either by the OAU or the UN or both.

7. ON WHAT ISSUE COULD A POSSIBLE REFERENDUM FOCUS? WHAT TERRITORY SHOULD IT BE ORGANISED ON?

In principle, it seems right that a referendum should only take place on Cabindan territory; naturally this is where the issue a concern. The only objective would be to establish the true wish of all the Cabindan people.

One election should be sufficient to decide their opinion. The organisation of this should allow a large proportion of the widely spread population, including those refugees living outside of Cabinda’s borders on the land of the neighbouring counties, to take part.

Finally the actual question should be very straightforward and only concern the complete independence from both Angola and Portugal. Needless to say the ballot papers should be adapted to a probably largely illiterate population and in a clear format where there can be no confusion. They should be published.

All these appropriate measures are all ready in place and used in a large part of the world.

8. PROBABLE RESULTS OF A REFERENDUM, IN VIEW OF MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE REGION.

I could leave it there, however I feel I should emphasise to all whom it may concern the potential danger of adopting a bad solution to this issue.

The worry of stability in states, which recently have achieved independence (mentioned above) made these new states of Latin America, Africa and Asia anxious to stick to the borders inherited after colonisation. Generally new states have also agreed to oppose any attempt to revise these frontiers or the forming of any secessionist movement within these borders.

In the majority of cases these borders did not however take into account the physical geography, ethnic ties, cultural or linguistic factors of the population. Nonetheless these differences were present but they did not want to talk of separating what had already been established.

That was, as far as the new states were concerned, the only way to avoid chaos. Though we should again remember that when these borders pull together populations whose mutual desire to live together is uncertain, difficulties inevitably arise.

Even when minority revolts have been small (in Biafra for example), new independent states have always been collectively hostile to revolts inside of one sole geographical bloc against a majority of powerful states. Consequently secessionist attempts (sometimes sparking off serious international tension and bloodshed) have always failed.

However on the contrary separatist attempts of distinct identities have been successful when the fraction of territory and the main part of the country to which it was attached (sometimes somewhat artificially), have been geographically separated. Such was the case of Bangladesh.

If we transfer these points to the current case of Cabinda, a serious danger for peace in the region becomes clear through two theories:

1- If no referendum takes place and Cabinda stays annexed to Angola in spite of its ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences and geographical separation, there could be the risk of secessionist revolts against Angola. At which point Angolan troops would be dispatched to invade Cabinda, through Zairian territory perhaps? Would the neighbouring states, particularly Zaire, view this apparent raid calmly? It seems more probable that any such action would bring up serious difficulties with regard to the region’s peace.

Would it not be better:
· If the wish for independence in Cabinda were clear to immediately satisfy its request and therefore avoid even the little agitation that could result from a referendum?
· Or if this wish weren’t clear, to organise such a referendum?

If this referendum proved in favour of independence, this would remove all cause of difficulty with the neighbouring states and any fear of the creation of another “Dantzig Corridor”, which would be detrimental to Zaire and also rule out the possibility an anti-Angolan sentiment in Cabinda.

2- We should not however overlook the possibility of a referendum in favour of allowing Angola to annex Cabinda. Such a result, even surrounded by serious guarantees would I fear not assure long lasting peace. There would be a risk of once again awakening the difficult and volatile problem of communications between the two countries across the most precious part of Zairian territory, the passage across which puts considerable strain on relations.

All the considerations of recent political history bring me to conclude that if the Cabindan population want independence, immediately granting them this would be the best solution for peace in the region.

At this point I believe we ought to consider the words of President Nyeréré: “No African people fight out of pleasure. But all peoples of the world want to live in freedom. It is in desperation for this cause that they feel forced to die for this freedom”. (Speech of the 8th January 1975 at Dar-es-Salam at the opening sitting of the 24th Session of the Committee of Coordination for the Freedom of Africa.)

To my mind, it would be best to quickly and carefully resolve this issue avoiding anything that could lead to a call to arms.


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UM TRATADO EM VIGOR


A obtenção de mercados, a necessidade de matérias-primas para alimentar as indústrias a produzir em pleno, a curiosidade científica, o movimento humanitarista levaram os povos europeus capazes, com longa vocação ultramarina ou não, à partilha da África, substituindo-se o direito histórico pelo direito de ocupação efectiva e aproveitamento dos, territórios. No último quartel do século XIX, a partilha consumasse. A esse tempo, a colonização era uma acção meritória, apetecida de muitos. Colonizar era sinónimo de civilizar - missão e direito dos povos civilizados.

Apertados por belgas e franceses, receosos da influência interesseira dos britânicos, os nobres de Cabinda, representantes genuínos dos povos, houveram por bem fazer um tratado com portugal, fundamento das relações estáveis entre portugueses e Cabindas. O tratado viria estreitar as tradições de amizade que há séculos os dois povos mantinham entre si.

Firmou-se o tratado de Simulambuco a 1 de Fevereiro de 1885, por livre e expressa vontade dos Notáveis de N'Goyo. Quer dizer: trata-se duma autodeterminação indiscutível, ao diante reafirmado em momentos oportunos.

Com argumentos capciosos e envenenados, há quem, pretenda o tratado destituído de valor.

Seja como for, ele representa uma terrível acusação contra o procedimento português após o 25 de Abril.

Os Cabindas continuam agarrados ao espírito do tratado e sabemos que ainda pretendem continuar ligados a portugal por certos laços. Comovedora é esta atitude e, sem dúvida, digna de profunda reflexão.
Mas os cubanos estão em Cabinda - sem tratado. São invasores sem justificação, sem o amor dos povos, altivos e aportuguesados até à medula, das terras riquíssimas de N'Goyo.

Seguem-se a petição e o tratado em apreço.

Tratados do Povo Honrado de Cabinda com os portugueses.

1 - Tratado de Chinfuma 29 Setembro de 1883

Acta:

Aos 29 dias do mês de Setembro do ano do nascimento de Nosso Senhor Jesus Cristo de 1883, no morro de Chinfuma, em Lândana, na costa ocidental de África, achando-se reunidos como representantes por parte do governo português o capitão-tenente da armada Guilherme Augusto de Brito Capelo, comandante da corveta rainha de portugal, e pela dos Povos que habitam os territórios de ambas as margens do rio Kakongo, os Príncipes e mais Cavalheiros, actuais Chefes e Governadores dos mesmos Povos, que por todos os presentes foram reconhecidos como sendo os próprios, juntamente com os negociantes portugueses e estrangeiros, donos das casas comerciais estabelecidas em Lândana, Chiloango e margens do citado rio, os quais se prestaram a assistir a esta reunião como testemunhas dos actos que nela se praticassem, Robert F. Hammick da canhoneira inglesa Flirt, e o gerente da casa Hatton & Cookson R. E. Demet, foi pelo referido comandante, declarado que tendo alguns Chefes manifestado desejos de pedirem a protecção de portugal, sob cuja soberania queria ficar, por ser a nação com a qual mantinham mais e constantes relações, tanto comerciais como de hábitos e linguagem, desde que europeus haviam pisado território de África para o sul do Equador, ele comandante vinha agora munido de plenos poderes que lhe tinham sido conferidos pelo governo de sua majestade el-rei de portugal, a fim de fazer um tratado que, depois de assinado e aprovado por ambas as partes contratantes, estabelecesse as futuras relações entre portugal e os Países Governados pelos Chefes que assinassem.

E tendo os Príncipes e mais Cavalheiros formalmente declarado que queriam firmar com a sua assinatura um documento pelo qual ficasse bem autenticado o Protectorado e soberania de portugal sobre todos os territórios que se estendem do rio Massabe até Malembo, se discutiram e aprovaram onze artigos de um tratado que depois de lido e explicado em boa e devida forma, tanto em português como em língua do país, foi por todos assinado.

E para que de futuro ficassem bem autenticadas as resoluções tomadas nesta solene reunião, se lavrou esta acta, que vai por todos assinada, ficando junto ao tratado, do qual se tiraram cópias devidamente certificadas e seladas com o selo usado nos documentos oficiais da corveta rainha de portugal, e entregues aos principais Chefes, Tali-e-Tali, Príncipe Regente do Reino de Kakongo, Mancoche, Rei do Encoche Luango, António Tiaba da Costa, Governador de Massabe, digo António Tiaba da Costa, Regente do Reino de Chinchôcho, representando a Rainha Samano; Mangoal, Príncipe Regente do Mambuco Manipolo; António Tiaba da Costa, Governador de Massabe, representantes de Chefes dali, que receberam também a bandeira portuguesa para a mandarem içar nas suas povoações e nos locais que fossem cedidos ao governo português, a fim de a conservarem e defenderem como símbolo representativo da soberania e Protectorado de portugal sobre os territórios por eles governados.

Morro do Chinfuma, 29 de Setembro de 1883

Guilherme Augusto de Brito Capelo, comandante da corveta rainha de portugal.
+ Sinal do Príncipe Tali-e-Tali.
+ Sinal do Rei Mancoche.
- A. Tiaba da Costa.
+ Sinal do Príncipe Mambuco.
+ Sinal de Matanga do Tenda.
- Cristiano Frederico Krusse Gomes, 1.' tenente da armada.
- Aquiles de Almeida Navarro, facultativo naval de 1.a classe.
- João Rodrigues Leitão Sobrinho, negociante em Lândana.
- William Rattray, Chiloango.
- Pedro Berquó, guarda-marinha.
- Fidel del Valle.
- António Nunes Serra e Moura, oficial de fazenda da armada.


Tratado

Guilherme Augusto de Brito Capelo, capitão-tenente da armada, comendador de Avis e cavaleiro de várias Ordens, comandante da corveta rainha de portugal, delegado por parte do governo de sua majestade eI-rei de portugal, concluiu com os Príncipes Tali-e-Tali, Regente do Reino de Kakongo, Mancoche, Rei do Encoche-Luango, António Tiaba da Costa, Regente do Reino de Chinchôcho, representante da Rainha Samano e Mangoal, Regente do Mambuco, e seus Sucessores, bem como os mais Chefes dos territórios que do no Massabe se estendem até Malembo, na Costa Ocidental de África, o seguinte :

Artigo 1.' - Os Príncipes e mais Chefes do País, e seus Sucessores, declaram, voluntariamente, reconhecer a soberania de portugal, colocando sob o Protectorado desta nação todos os territórios por eles governados.

Artigo 2.' - portugal reconhece os actuais Chefes e confirmará os que de futuro forem eleitos pelos povos, segundo as suas leis e usos, prometendo-lhes auxílio e Protecção.

Artigo 3.' - portugal obrigasse a manter a integridade dos territórios colocados sob o seu Protectorado.

Artigo 4.' - Aos Chefes do país e seus Habitantes será conservado o Senhorio directo das terras que lhes pertencem, podendo-as vender ou alienar de qualquer forma para o estabelecimento de feitorias de negócio ou outras indústrias particulares, mediante o pagamento dos costumes, marcando-se duma maneira clara e precisa a área dos terrenos concedidos, para evitar complicações futuras, devendo ser ratificados os contratos pelos comandantes dos navios de guerra portugueses.

Artigo 5.' - A maior liberdade será concedida aos negociantes de todas as nações para se estabelecerem nestes territórios, ficando o governo português obrigado a Proteger esses estabelecimentos, reservando-se o direito de proceder como julgar mais conveniente, quando se provar que se tenta destruir o domínio de portugal nestas regiões.

Artigo 6.' - Os Príncipes e mais Chefes indígenas obrigam-se a não fazer tratados, nem ceder terrenos aos representantes de nações estrangeiras, quando esta cedência seja de carácter oficial e não com o fim mencionado no artigo 4-'.

Artigo 7.' - Igualmente se obriga a proteger o comércio quer dos portugueses,
quer dos estrangeiros e indígenas, não permitindo interrupção nas comunicações com o interior e a fazer uso da sua autoridade para desembaraçar os caminhos, facilitando e protegendo as relações entre compradores e vendedores, as missões religiosas e científicas que se estabelecerem temporária ou permanentemente nos seus territórios, assim, como o desenvolvimento da agricultura.

# único - Obrigam-se mais a não permitir o tráfico da escravatura nos limites dos seus domínios.

Artigo 8.' - Toda e qualquer questão entre europeus e indígenas, será resolvida sempre com a assistência do comandante de guerra do navio português que nessa ocasião estiver em possível comunicação com a terra.

Artigo 9.' - portugal respeitará e fará respeitar os usos e costumes do País.

Artigo 10.' - Os Príncipes e Chefes cedem a portugal a propriedade inteira e completa de porções de terrenos em Lândana, Chinchôcho e Massabe, que serão marcados de combinação com os Chefes dessas localidades a quem os Príncipes encarregam de fazer a entrega.

Do acto de posse se lavrarão dois autos, um dos quais ficará na mão do delegado do governo português e o outro na do Chefe indígena.

Artigo 11.' - O presente tratado assinado pelos Príncipes e Chefes do País, bem como pelo capitão-tenente comandante da corveta rainha de portugal, começará a ter execução desde o dia da sua assinatura, não podendo contudo considerar-se definitivo senão depois de ter sido aprovado pelo governo de sua majestade el-rei de portugal.

Chinfuma em Lândana, 29 de Setembro de 1883

- Guilherme Augusto de Brito Capelo, comandante da corveta rainha de portugal.
+ Sinal do Príncipe Tali-e-Tali, Regente do Reino de Kakongo.
+ Sinal do Príncipe Mambuco, Vice-Rei de Kakongo.
+ Sinal do Representante da Rainha Samano, A. Tiaba da Costa.
- Chela.
+ Sinal de Maluango, Cavalheiro de Chinchôcho.
+ Sinal de Mangovo-Mambo, Cavalheiro de Chinchôcho.
+ Sinal de Matenda da Ponta de Lândana.
+ Sinal de Marumba, Cavalheiro de Lândana e Malembo.
+ Sinal de Mancoche de Muba, Cavalheiro de Lândana e Malembo.
+ Sinal de Mancungo, Cavalheiro de Lândana e Malembo.
+ Sinal de Michela, Cavalheiro de Malembo.
+ Sinal de Mambanga, Cavalheiro de Lândana e Malembo.
+ Sinal de Binduco, Cavalheiro de Lândana e Malembo.
+ Sinal de Capita, Cavalheiro de Lândana e Malembo.
+ Sinal de Mangove Fernandes, Cavalheiro de Malembo.
+ Sinal de Maçassa-Manifuta, Cavalheiro de Kakongo.
+ Sinal de Matanga, do Luvula.
+ Sinal de Mafuca, de Lândana.
+ Sinal de Malambo, de Lândana.
+ Sinal de Mafuca-Baba, de Malembo.
+ Sinal de Manimbanza, do Chilunga.
+ Sinal de Ganga-Chinfuma, de Lândana.
+ Sinal de Garga-Bembo, de Lândana.
+ Sinal de Matenda, do Boiça.
+ Sinal de Capita-Manitate, de Kakongo.
+ Sinal de Capita-Mambuco, do Malembo.
+ Sinal de Mangove, do Ombuco.
+ Sinal de Mangove, do Tenda.
+ Sinal do Príncipe Mamimbache, do Kakongo.
+ Sinal de Ganga de Mechemechama, do Kakongo.
+ Sinal de Ganga de Chinfuma, do Malembo.
+ Sinal de Ganga Mafula, do Kakongo.
+ Sinal de Capita Manimacundo, do Malembo.
+ Sinal de Ganga e Lunga, do Kakongo.
+ Sinal de Mentata do Luvula, da Ponta de Lândana.
+ Sinal de Bundo, de Tenda.
+ Sinal de Mampagala, de Tenda.
+ Sinal do Príncipes Masange, do Massabe.
+ Sinal de Maunvule, do Massabe.
+ Sinal de Mabichete, do Massabe.
+ Sinal de Pincho, do Massabe.
+ Sinal de Maticibala, do Massabe.
+ Sinal de Manuela, do Massabe.
+ Sinal de Massuco, do Massabe.
+ A. Tiaba da Coata, do Massabe.
+ Sinal de Ganga-Muculo, do Encoche-Luango.
+ Sinal de Umbinduco, Encoche-Luango.
+ Sinal de Massi-Mongo, Encoche-Luango.
+ Sinal de Banche-Luanda, Encoche-Luango.
+ Sinal de Mancaca , Encoche-Luango.
+ Sinal de Mangoge-Bembo da Costa, de Tenda.
+ Sinal de Meimecasso, de Tenda.
+ Sinal de Mangove-Mazunga, de Malembo.
+ Sinal de António Pitra, de Malembo .

Nós abaixo assinados, certificamos que as assinaturas e sinais são dos próprios, por os termos visto fazer e os reconhecermos individualmente.

João José Rodrigues Leitão Sobrinho Negociante em Lândana A. Tiaba da Costa Fidel del Valle (autenticado com o selo das armas reais)


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2 - Tratado de Chicamba 26 Dezembro de 1884

Acta:

Aos 26 dias do mês de Dezembro do ano do nascimento de Nosso Senhor Jesus Cristo de 1884, no Chicambo, margem esquerda do rio Luema, a 30 milhas, pouco mais ou menos, do Massabe, achando-se reunidos como representantes por parte do governo português, o delegado do mesmo governo em Kakongo e Massabe, José Emílio dos Santos Silva e o capitão de 2.' linha António Thiaba da Costa, chefe da estação civilizadora em Kakongo e Massabe, e o secretário da estação civilizadora, em Kakongo e Massabe, José António da Conceição, e pela parte dos Povos que se estendem pela margem esquerda do rio Luema desde N'Cula, ate a embocadura numa extensão pouco mais ou menos de 60 milhas, abrangendo N'Geba, Chicambo e Buamongo, os Príncipes e Cavalheiros que os governam actualmente, que por todos os presentes foram reconhecidos como sendo os próprios, foi pelo delegado do governo declarado que, tendo estes Príncipes e Cavalheiros, Governadores destes territórios, manifestado desejos de serem incluídos no Protectorado que portugal estabeleceu em Kakongo e Massabe, ficando sob a sua soberania, por ser a Nação com a qual mantinham mais constantes relações, tanto comerciais como de hábitos e linguagem, desde que os europeus haviam pisado terras d' África para Sul do Equador, ele delegado como representante do governo português, se achava autorizado a conceder aos indígenas a anexação pedida, fazendo um tratado que, depois de aprovado e assinado, estabelecesse as desejadas relações entre portugal e os Países governados pelos Chefes que o assinassem. E tendo os Príncipes e mais Cavalheiros formalmente declarado que queriam firmar um documento pelo qual ficasse bem autenticado o Protectorado e soberania de portugal sobre todos os territórios do Massabe até ao N'Cula pela margem esquerda do rio Luema, se discutiram e aprovaram doze artigos d'um tratado que, depois de explicado em boa e devida forma, tanto em português como em língua do País foi por todos assinado (com sinal da cruz por não saberem escrever).

E, para que de futuro ficassem bem autenticadas as resoluções tomadas nesta solene reunião, se lavrou esta acta que vai por todos assinada ficando junto ao tratado, da qual tiraram cópias devidamente certificadas e entregues aos Príncipes Machamba, Governador de Buamongo, Mai-Sexo, Governador de Guamon-o, N'Ganza-Camba, Governador de Chicambo, Mangemba, Governador de N'Geba, Mancuta, Governador do N'Cula, que receberam também a bandeira portuguesa para a mandarem içar nas suas povoações e nos locais que convenientemente depois designassem, a fim de a conservarem e defenderem como símbolo representativo da soberania e Protectorado de portugal.


Chicambo, 26 de Dezembro de 1884

José Emílio dos Santos Silva, delegado do governo português
- A. Thiaba da Costa, Capitão de 2.' linha.
- José António da Conceição, Secretário da estação civilizadora
+ Signal do Rei Machimba .
+ Signal de Cutoto.
+ Signal de Massanza.
+ Signal de Bolamba.
+ Signal de Gangacaca.
+ Signal do Rei Mai-Sexo.
+ Signal de Pita da Praia.
+ Signal de Bivumbi.
+ Signal de Mambuco Mani Luemba.
+ Signal do Rei Macai.
+ Signal de Chibilongo.
+ Signal de Mamboma N'Cusso.
+ Signal de Macacata.
+ Signal de Manganda-Cai.
+ Signal do Rei Ganga-Misi .
+ Signal de Culombo.
+ Signal de Machichita.
+ Signal do Rei Mangalola.
+ Signal de Ganga Camba Bona.
+ Signal de Mafuca N'Gali.
+ Signal de Machanzi-Monzo.
+ Signal do Príncipe Muene Tati
+ Signal de Luangili.
+ Signal de Mando.
+ Signal de Mafuca Macosse.
+ Signal de Machienzi Zuela.
+ Signal de Mafuca Naungi.
+ Signal de Mamboma Issambo.
+ Signal de N'Bundo Pubo.
+ Signal Mafuca N'Goma.
+ Signal de N'Coti Cuanda Poáti.
+ Signal de Calumbo.
+ Signal de Massongo.
+ Signal de Mamando.
+ Signal de Mansalisi Chibaza.
+ Signal de Chimbi Chianga.
+ Signal de Maconde Bitumbo.
+ Signal de Cibanza.
+ Signal de Lingster Pandi Numtoto-Ola.
+ Signal Michienzi Buanga .
+ Signal de Mafuca Mavingo.
+ Signal de Mambuco M'Paca.
+ Signal de Mafuca Pambo.
+ Signal de Chibuqueli Muene Pambo.
+ Signal de Muene Banza Pambo.
+ Signal de Mangofo Panzo.
+ Signal de Muene N'Zau.
+ Signal de Lingster Filipe.
+ Signal de Mafuca N'Buia.
+ Signal de Massavi N-Cambo.
+ Signal de Mafuca Chiluemba.
+ Signal de Ganga N'Zomongo.
+ Signal de N-Combe.
+ Sinal de Mambuco Mani-Macambo.
+ Signal de Chibuquila Mani-Muto.
+ Signal de Macaia Chintomo.
+ Signal de Mamona Chibua.
+ Signal de Ganga Luti.
+ Signal de Benze Mongofo N'Poáti.
+ Signal de Bungo Michivata.
+ Signal de Mamboma N'Bungo.
+ Signal de Ganga Lamongo.

José Emílio dos Santos Silva, alferes da África Ocidental, delegado do governo português e chefe da estação civilizadora em Cacongo e Massabe, conclui com os Príncipes Malhambo, Mai-Sexo, Ganga, Camba, Mangeba e Mancala, Governadores e Regentes dos Povos de Buamongo, Guamongo, Chicambo, N'Geba e N'Cula, bem como os mais Chefes dos territórios que do Massabe se estendem até ao N'Culo, a NE do Massabe, Costa Ocidental de África, o seguinte tratado (. .)

Nota : O tratado é textualmente igual ao do Chinfuma acrescido de mais um artigo. do seguinte teor: "Artigo 12.- São declarados nulos quaisquer tratados contratos que, encerrem cláusulas e, contrárias aos artigos anteriores (Cfr. João de Matos e Silva, Contribuição para o Estudo da Região de Cabinda, cit., pp. 146-147).


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3 - Tratado de Simulambuco 1 de Fevreiro 1885

Petição:

Nós abaixo assinados, Príncipes e Governadores de Cabinda, sabendo que na
Europa se trata de resolver, em conferência de embaixadores de diferentes potências,
questões que directamente dizem respeito aos territórios da Costa Ocidental de África,
e por conseguinte, aos destinos dos seus povos, aproveitamos a estada neste porto da corveta portuguesa rainha de portugal, a fim de em nosso nome e no dos Povos que governamos, pedirmos ao seu comandante, como delegado do governo de sua majestade fidelíssima, para fazermos e concordarmos num tratado pelo qual fiquemos sob o Protectorado de portugal, tomando-nos, de facto, súbditos da coroa portuguesa, como já o éramos por costumes, hábitos e relações de amizade.
E, portanto, sendo de nossa inteira, plena e livre vontade que de futuro entremos nos domínios da coroa portuguesa, pedimos ao ex.mo sr. comandante da corveta portuguesa, para aceder aos nossos desejos e dos Povos que governamos, determinando o dia onde, em sessão solene, se há-de assinar o tratado que nos coloque sob a protecção da bandeira de portugal.

Escrito em reunião dos Príncipes abaixo assinados, no lugar de Simulambuco, aos 22 de Janeiro de 1885.

+ Sinal de Ibiala, Mamboma do Rei, representante da Regência.
+ Sinal da Princesa Maria Simbo, Mambuco.
- Manuel José Puna, Barão de Cabinda.
+ Sinal do Príncipe Sambo Franque, Governador de Chinga.
+ Sinal do Príncipe Jack, Governador de Buco-Sinto.
+ Sinal de Fernando Minga, filho do Príncipe Jack.
+ Sinal de King Jack, Príncipe da Ponta do Tafe.
+ Sinal de Fernando Sonça, Governador do Povo Grande.
+ Sinal do Mangunvo Mamgombe, Governador do Caio.
- Manoel Bonzela Franque, Governador do Porto Rico e Mutambe.
- Francisco Rodrigues Franque, Governador de Pernambuco e Vitória.
+ Sinal de Mani Sabo, Governador de Chóbo.
+ Sinal de Perico, linguester.
+ Sinal de Michimbi Mafuka Franque.
+ Sinal do Príncipe Mani Sambo,
- linguester de Francisco Franque.


Tratado

Guilherme Augusto de Brito Capelo, capitão-tenente da armada, comandante da corveta rainha de portugal, comendador de Avis e cavaleiro de varias Ordens, autorizado pelo governo de sua majestade fidelíssima el-rei de portugal, satisfazendo aos desejos manifestados pelos Príncipes de Cabinda em petição, devidamente por eles assinada em grande fundação, concluiu com os referidos Príncipes, Governadores e Chefes abaixo assinados, seus Sucessores e herdeiros o seguinte

Artigo 1.' - Os Príncipes e mais Chefes do País, e seus sucessores, declaram, voluntariamente, reconhecer a soberania de portugal, colocando sob o Protectorado desta nação todos os territórios por eles governados.

Artigo 2.' - portugal reconhece os actuais Chefes e confirmará os que de futuro forem eleitos pelos Povos, segundo as suas leis e usos, prometendo-lhes auxílio e protecção.

Artigo 3.' - portugal obriga-se a manter a integridade dos territórios colocados sob o seu Protectorado.

Artigo 4.' - Aos Chefes do País e seus Habitantes será conservado o Senhorio directo das terras que lhes pertencem, podendo-as vender ou alienar de qualquer forma para o estabelecimento de feitorias de negócio ou outras indústrias particulares, mediante o pagamento dos costumes, marcando-se duma maneira clara e precisa a área dos terrenos concedidos, para evitar complicações futuras, devendo ser ratificados os contratos pelos comandantes dos navios de guerra portugueses ou pela autoridade em que o governo de sua majestade delegar os seus poderes.

Artigo 5.' - A maior liberdade será concedida aos negociantes de todas as nações para se estabelecerem nestes territórios, ficando o governo português obrigado a proteger esses estabelecimentos, reservando-se o direito de proceder como julgar mais conveniente, quando se provar que se tenta destruir o domínio de portugal nestas regiões.

Artigo 6..' - Os Príncipes e mais Chefes indígenas obrigam-se a não fazer tratados, nem ceder terrenos aos representantes de nações estrangeiras, quando esta cedência seja de carácter oficial e não com o fim mencionado no artigo 4.'.

Artigo 7.' - Igualmente se obriga a proteger o comércio quer dos portugueses, quer dos estrangeiros e indígenas, não permitindo interrupção nas comunicações com o interior e a fazer uso da sua autoridade para desembaraçar os caminhos, facilitando e protegendo as relações entre compradores e vendedores, as missões religiosas e científicas que se estabelecerem temporária ou permanentemente nos seus territórios, assim, como o desenvolvimento da agricultura.

# único - Obrigam-se mais a não permitir o tráfico da escravatura nos limites dos seus domínios.

Artigo 8.' - Toda e qualquer questão entre europeus e indígenas, será resolvida sempre com a assistência do comandante de guerra do navio português que nessa ocasião estiver em possível comunicação com a terra ou de quem estiver munido de poderes devidamente legalizados.

Artigo 9.' - portugal respeitará e fará respeitar os usos e costumes do País.

Artigo 10.' - Os Príncipes e Chefes cedem a portugal a propriedade inteira e completa de porções de terreno mediante o pagamento dos respectivos valores, a fim de neles o governo português mandar edificar os seus estabelecimentos militares, administrativos ou particulares.

Artigo 11.' - O presente tratado assinado pelos Príncipes e Chefes do País, bem como pelo capitão-tenente comandante da corveta rainha de portugal, começará a ter execução desde o dia da sua assinatura, não podendo contudo considerar-se definitivo senão depois de ter sido aprovado pelo governo de sua majestade.

Simulambuco, em Cabinda, 1 de Fevereiro de 1885

(a) Guilherme Augusto de Brito Capelo, comandante da corveta rainha de portugal.


+ de Neto do Príncipe Gime, Vice-Rei.
(a) Guilherme Augusto de Brito Capelo, comandante da corveta rainha de portugal.
+ de Neto do Príncipe Gime, Vice-Rei.
+ de Ibiála, Mamboma do Rei e representante da Regência.
+ Muanafumo Mahundo, filho do falecido Rei.
+ de Mangove Dangoio Puata Puna.
+ da Princesa Maria Gimbe, Mambuko.
(a) Barão de Cabinda, Manuel José Puna.
+ Sambo Franque, Governador do Chinga.
+ Machimbi, Mafuca Franque.
+ Mavungo Mangombe, Governador de Samona.
(a) Manuel Bonzola Franque, Governador de Porto Rico e Mutamba.
(a) Francisco R. Franque, Governador de Pernambuco e Vitória.
+ Fernando Sonsa, Governador do Povo Grande.
+ Pucuta Caetano, Iinguister de Porto Rico.
+ Manichuvula, Príncipe, Mambuko de Buco-Sinto.
+ King Jack, Príncipe de Ponta do Tafe.
+ King Taine, Príncipe de Ponta do Tafé.
+ Fenando Mingas, filho do Príncipe Jack do Buco-Sinto.
+ Mangove Velho, Dono do Povo Grande.
+ Filho do Príncipe Bette Jack, Governador do Caio,
+ Manissabo, Governador de Chobo.
+ Perico Franque, linguister de Mambuco.
+ Puata Puna.
+ Luemba Franque, irmão do Príncipe Sambo, Governador do Chinga.


Este tratado foi lido e explicado em língua do País, ficando todos inteirados do seu conteúdo antes de assinarem e fazerem o sinal + (cruz) na minha presença, comigo António Nunes de Serra e Moura, aspirante do corpo de oficiais da fazenda da armada, servindo de secretário a este acto.

(a) António Nunes de Serra e Moura, aspirante efectivo da fazenda da armada.

Afirmamos e juramos, sendo preciso, que as assinaturas e sinais são dos indivíduos acima indicados por os conhecermos pessoalmente e os termos visto assinar este acto.

(a) João Puna; João Barros Franque, filho de Francisco Franque, coronel honorário que foi; Vicente Puna; Guilherme Franque, filho de Francisco Franque.

Estavam presentes as seguintes pessoas :

(a) Onofre Alves de Sousa; M. J. Correia; J. Contreiras; Alexandre; Manuel António da Silva.

- Os oficiais da corveta rainha de portugal: Cristiano Frederico Krusse Gomes. 1° tenente; Eduardo Ciríaco, 1° tenente; João de Matos e Silva, facultativo naval de 1a classe; Alberto António da Silva Moreno, guarda-marinha; João Francisco da Silva, guarda-marinha; João António Ludovice, guarda-marinha.

Nota : (a) Assinam com os respectivos nomes.
 




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