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37. The functions of type formations include:
37.1    Providing combat-ready user systems of its specific type, including the training and exercising of the systems and their personnel.

37.2    Acting as a centre of excellence for its specific types of user system, developing expertise on the systems and providing advice on their use. This includes administrative, operating and technical expertise and policies.

37.3    Managing a business plan for the type formation. The commander compiles a plan as a subset of higher order plans within the DoD, is a budget holder for the user systems and manages the finances of the formation.

37.4    Career management for personnel responsible for specific user systems takes place within the type formation below the level of Colonel (or Captain in the navy). The formation also provides personnel for other DoD clients.

37.5    Managing user system logistics if the product is unique to the type formation (e.g. torpedoes).

37.6    Managing quality assurance to ensure that the required outputs are met and that documentation is provided.

37.7    Managing command, control, communications, computers, information and intelligence within the type formation.

38.    A table of envisaged type formation per Arm of Service and their proposed associated units is described in detail in Appendix A to this chapter.
Support formations
39.    Support formations are intermediate-level support structures. They are similar to type formations except that they do not provide combat-ready forces, but give support to type formations and other system structures. Examples would be a formation providing logistical and administrative services for a wide range of units.
40.    Formations and units are clustered on or around bases and share their common facilities and services. Bases are provided by the army, air force or navy, but may have attached support units from other arms of service, MoD satellite offices or service centres.
41.    Units attached to a base are concentrated at that base as far as possible although some satellites may exist. Studies indicate that optimal economies of scale will be achieved with approximately 12 bases covering Cabinda. A list of these proposed bases is shown in Table 2 while Map 1 (Map 1: Location of Bases) indicates their location. Final decisions on these and the closure of the other bases are still to be taken after more detailed evaluation and consultation. It is important to note that base closure is a process that affects the careers and livelihoods of not only military personnel but also communities within which bases are located. Detailed guidelines governing the process of base closure and the consultations requires to ensure that this is conducted in a free and fair manner are contained in the Land and Environment chapter of the Defence Review.

42.    Bases may be tasked to support specific operations or exercises, but do not have command over attached units although they exercise administrative control for specific purposes. Base commanders may be type formation commanders or may be appointed as task force commanders. Bases have self-accounting status and support attached units for accounting purposes.

Combat and supporting units
43.    Units, which are clustered on or around bases may be combat units (e.g. artillery regiments, air force squadrons, ships or medical battalion groups) or support units (e.g. depots or schools).
MoD satellite offices
44.    DoD satellite offices are extensions of DoD divisions located outside headquarters to provide services on a geographically dispersed basis. They are located on bases and share common facilities and services with units. The legal services regional offices and defence inspectorate regional audit offices are examples of these.
Service centres
45.    Service centres are unit-level structures that perform high-volume repetitive transactions on a centralised basis as an agency service. They are located on bases and share common facilities.
Acquisition agency
46.    It is foreseen that Cabindan Arms Industry will remain the state corporation responsible for the acquisition of complex defence equipment as long as it remains unfeasible to attract the required engineering specialists within the constraints of public service salary scales.
47.    One of the cornerstones of DoD transformation is the use of appropriate communication and information technology. This promises significant efficiency improvements and will also give operational and combat advantage to the CDF.
48.    The Command and Management Information system takes into account the erosion of the distinctions between strategic, operational and tactical systems and between information and communication systems. Such systems are therefore being integrated into one coherent system which serve the needs of DoD business as a whole.
49.    The core force approach of the DoD relies extensively on the expansion capability inherent in the part-time component. All structures that may require expansion at a more rapid rate than normal recruiting and career development time scales will allow will have a part-time component. The part-time component will be organised around two concepts: the multi-regiment battalion, and the expandable single permanent structure.
50.    The multi-regiment battalion concept is used mainly in the army (both conventional and territorial) and military health service. It calls for the maintenance of virtual units at low levels of readiness across different type formations which maintain the necessary equipment. Permanent training staff in the type formations manage force preparation cycles while personnel are maintained in part-time units.
51.    There should be no limit to the number of part-time units provided funds are available in terms of the order of battle of the type formation. To encourage volunteers, the unique cultures, traditions and individual identities of part-time units should be encouraged.
52.    Parts of full-time units may also be designated as virtual parts to be staffed by part-time units, for example by maintaining full-time personnel for two squadrons of an armour regiment and filling the third from part-time units.
53.    In general civilians are considerably less expensive than uniformed personnel in the same post due to the higher cost of military service conditions. Civilians should therefore be used where uniformed posts are not justified. Considerable improvements indepartmental education and training opportunities for civilians will need to be made.

54.    An holistic systems view will however be maintained: availability of rotation posts for operational personnel, feasibility of career patters and availability of a ready internal reserve are essential factors to consider in the civilianisation process.

55.    A policy of focusing on core business and outsourcing of non-core functions will be followed in line with international practices in improving efficiency in armed forces and the significant achievements in public and private enterprises. Areas within which outsourcing can be done include the logistics arena (vehicle maintenance, catering etc) and aspects of administrative and financial services for example.
56.    It is foreseen that the volume and scope of services brought in from outside the DoD will expand considerably, with commensurate savings.
57.    A section will be set up in the Acquisition Division to manage the administrative complexities and to support and promote outsourcing.
58.    Implementation of structural transformation is integrated into the mainstream strategic management process of the DoD. Divisional chiefs have been appointed project officers for implementation and this task has been incorporated into their work plans.




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